“How Do You Say Moderate in Palestinian? Wasatia”

OP-EDS & REVIEWS

By Gil Troy, Jerusalem Post, 2-7-12

Since the Oslo peace process hopes disappeared amid the blasts of suicide bombings, peace-loving Israelis have searched vainly for Palestinian moderates – or signs of moderation. Mahmoud Abbas’s decision to unite with Hamas, and probably sideline his constructive Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, prove just how relative the term “moderate” can be.  There must be more to Palestinian moderation than not being the violent Islamist radicals of Hamas.
In 2008, I published a book calledLeading from the Center: Why Moderates Make the Best Presidents”, insisting that moderates are not wimps.  When rooted in bedrock principles and pragmatic sensibilities, moderation becomes more than a will o’ the wisp, ever-shifting, relative term. Many of America’s most successful presidents, beginning with George Washington, were muscular moderates, open to differing views but not hostage to them, tempering principle with pragmatism, blessed with vision, molding consensus.
I did not know that a year earlier, a Palestinian academic, Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi, had published his own moderation manifesto, called Wasatia.”  Derived from the Arabic word “wasat” for “middle of the road,” it means “’middle ground’, ‘centrism,’ ‘balance,’ ‘moderation, ‘justice.’” Dajani traces the idea to the Koranic verse:  “And thus We have created you a mid-ground nation…. Thus have We made of you an Ummatan Wasatan (justly balanced).”  Dajani belongs to a leading Palestinian Jerusalemite family, keepers of the keys to King David’s tomb for over eight centuries. A radical in the 1970s, while then earning two doctorates in the United States he embraced American values of democratic consultation, conciliation, and consensus.
Dajani rejects the Islamist view that extremism is the best way or the most authentic Islamic way. He quotes the Prophet Mohammed saying, “The best way to run affairs is through moderation.” Wasatia, Dajani explains, “is the first Islamic movement to advocate achieving peace and prosperity through the promotion of a culture of moderation that would lead to walking away from the current climate of religious and political extremism that is escalating fear and violence.  Wasatiareclaims the moderate centrist position — that balance, between love and hate, between friendship and enmity, between despair and hope, which will lead the Middle East out of chronic conflict and despair.”
Blending Koranic verses extolling “the virtues of middle ground, coexistence, democracy, and tolerance,” advocating a two-state solution, Dajani and his fellow moderates, including his brother Dr. Munther Dajani Daoudi, seek to establish “a tolerant, democratic society at home through fostering a culture of moderation” in religion and politics. These peace-seeking moderates proclaim publicly, boldly, that “Wasatia welcomes the day when Palestinian children no longer are exposed to a literature of incitement, hate and violence, and instead grow up in a rich culture where they can co-exist in peace, prosperity and harmony.”
In his book, Mohammed Dajani repudiates the Koranic “misinterpretations and misquotes that call for enmity, terrorism, and violence” as being “openly inconsistent and incompatible with the core values of Islam, as stipulated in the text of the Holy Koran itself, notably, love, mercy, pluralism and freedom of religion.” Emphasizing the common values uniting Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Western civilization, the Dajanis work tirelessly to “reverse this trend through education and training workshops to provide leaders of the community with the knowledge and skills to take part in building bridges of political, cultural and religious understanding in order to play a more positive role in society.”  They want “to activate the role of religious leaders as peace builders, and to create platforms for the engagement with the civic society.  The goal is to make religion become part of the solution rather than remain part of the problem.”
Both Dajani brothers teach at Al-Quds University. While aware that young people are “vulnerable to extremist ideologies,” they see their students responding to their ideas, especially through the American Studies program which Mohammed Dajani chairs. They run a successful three-way parallel partnership involving Tel Aviv University, Al-Quds, and Oberlin College students, building a network of young believers in democracy, moderation, and coexistence, with a shared vocabulary rooted in the best of the American experience – even as we watch an American presidential campaign emphasizing extremism and idiocy over moderation and balance.
Thanks to Marvin Krislov, the President of Oberlin College, I recently met Mohammed Dajani. We rendezvoused in the Roladin café in the new Mamila Mall near Jaffa Gate. As we shared our mutually reinforcing dreams of moderation – for America and the Middle East – the legendary Israeli singer and peace activist David Broza’s “Tachat HaShamaim” (under the heavens), played in the background, giving the meeting an added blessing. Dajani told me that in his master’s seminar last semester, different students read different chapters from my book, presenting the particular model of presidential leadership that emerged from each chapter that inspired them, along with the associated American value. I was deeply moved to think that this book, written with a focus on the United States, might have resonance in the complicated Middle East.
In times of radicalism,” Mohammed Dajani writes, “being moderate is revolutionary.” My experiences with the Dajanis and their students reassured me that there are some revolutionary moderates. Nevertheless, we need more, including on the Israeli side. I am dismayed that Israelis have done little to encourage these moderates and to reciprocate. Both the Gaza disengagement and the recent Gilad Shalit deal boosted Hamas radicals, intentionally or not. The international community should do more to finance these moderates – where are the Europeans, with all their rhetoric, when they have a chance to do some good? For years, Israelis have complained that Palestinians lacked this moderate force. Now, when we see moderate sprouts that can be nurtured, we must mobCenter Field: “How Do You Say Moderate in Palestinian? Wasatia”

The writer is professor of history at McGill University and a Shalom Hartman Research Fellow in Jerusalem. He is the author of Why I Am A Zionist: Israel, Jewish Identity and the Challenges of Today and The History of American Presidential Elections.

Advertisements

Center Field: The two state solution as the only unhappy alternative

By Gil Troy, JPost, 10-2-08

Some readers objected to the end of my last column on the lessons of Oslo. Most of the column argued that Arab and particularly Palestinian rejectionism destroyed Oslo yet most Westerners could not fathom Palestinian political culture’s destructive and self-destructive addiction to violence. Nevertheless, I concluded, the only solution remains a two-state solution. Critics deemed this claim contradictory.

The two-state solution remains the most logical solution for Israelis and Palestinians because, like the infirmities of old age, it beats the alternative, or in this case, the alternatives. Extremist Palestinians advocate the one-state solution, trusting that masses of Palestinian voters in a secular democratic state would overwhelm Israelis. Across the spectrum, since 1967, many right-wing Israelis have endorsed the status quo, ignoring the psychic, moral, diplomatic, military, political, and economic costs to Israel of controlling millions of hostile non-citizens. A two-state solution can take many forms, including federations with Egypt and Jordan that would mean a three-state or a one and two half-state solution. Somehow, Israel must stop governing millions of Palestinians.

A post-Oslo acceptance of the two-state solution requires launching a new Palestinian entity with low expectations and no illusions, informed by the violence the Oslo process unleashed. In fact, a sophisticated, realistic approach to a Palestinian state should build on two additional failures beyond the Oslo debacle: Ehud Barak’s hasty withdrawal from southern Lebanon and Ariel Sharon’s undemocratic disengagement from Gaza. 

Ironically, of these three recent failures that promised peace but resulted in some form of prolonged war, only the Oslo peace process increased the Israeli death rate in the area under discussion. Israel suffered casualties steadily during its presence in Lebanon, sometimes as many as 20 to 25 soldiers annually. Since then, even including the Second Lebanon war, many fewer have died. Similarly from the start of Yasir Arafat’s renewed war against the Jewish people in 2000, more Israeli soldiers and civilians died in Gaza than the handful who died since the disengagement.

So, yes, the withdrawal from Lebanon emboldened Hizbullah and probably encouraged the Palestinians to believe they could accomplish more with terrorism than with diplomacy. And, yes, the disengagement from Gaza destroyed beautiful communities, disheartened thousands of individual patriots, launched Hamas to power, and subjected Sderot along with other communities in the Western Negev to traumatic, reprehensible bombardments. But the comparative death toll suggests that the alternative to leaving – staying – would have been more costly. The challenge, then, is to do what needs to be done more intelligently, more effectively, and less naively.

Now, many will argue that the West Bank is different, that Judea and Samaria are more integrally connected to the Jewish people than either Southern Lebanon or Gaza, and that, at this point, the rate of anti-Israeli violence is minimal. Moreover, whereas a Hamas-run Gaza can rain Kassams on a small, peripheral community like Sderot, a Hamas-run West Bank could rain more destructive missiles on Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Ben-Gurion Airport.

Ultimately, a sober, security-minded approach responds to these valid arguments and others by starting with the assumption that clear borders shrewdly and patiently negotiated offer more security than the current mess. Those who dream of Israel’s Biblical boundaries have to acknowledge that millions more Palestinians than Jews streamed to those areas in the twentieth century and that Israel’s security barrier has formalized the demographic realities as of 2000. Given the separation, it is better for Palestinians to control their own destiny than to have Israelis trying to control them. And, especially in today’s climate, the rules of engagement between hostile neighbors are much clearer than the protocols for one nation dominating another.

Had the Gaza disengagement been handled more intelligently, Israel would have had a good example of how to proceed. Ariel Sharon claimed there would be zero-tolerance for violence, that any attacks by air, sea, or land from Gaza would be dealt with severely. After the first post-engagement Kassam flew, Israel needed to respond militarily, close the border, cut off electricity in Gaza, and retake one evacuated settlement. Had Israel responded so aggressively once, maximum twice, the situation probably would not have deteriorated.

Unlike during the Oslo years, Israel should not rush into anything. Israel should approach the two-state solution gradually, with benchmarks of progress toward peace Palestinians could follow. If that sounds uneven, condescending, and high-handed, it also acknowledges the tragic fact that following the events of 2000 to 2004, Israel is the victim and the victor. The Palestinians unleashed the violence – and lost. In the equivalent of suing for peace, they have to demonstrate their readiness to make peace – with Israel free to retreat whenever security threats or violations occur.

A two-state solution could provide moral, diplomatic, and military clarity. Borders are easier to defend when they are clear, not ambiguous. Actions are easier to justify when the moral onus is on one aggressor not a people who play the victim card as an occupied people.

Ronald Reagan, the arch enemy of Communism, negotiated with the Soviets when he saw it was in his country’s best interests to do so. His mantra throughout the negotiations, “Trust but verify” reflected the need to progress with no illusions. Oslo buried many Israelis’ illusions about the short-term prospects of a true peace with the Palestinians, or most of the Arab world. But the Olso-triggered terrorism could not kill the need for progress or the chance, eventually, for some stability. The Oslo peace process assumed good will would develop quickly among the two peoples. A new approach should assume lingering bad faith among Palestinians unless hard evidence suggests otherwise. But bad faith does not preclude enduring stability or serious progress toward a more workable solution. Israel should not withdraw for the sake of the Palestinians, but for the sake of Israel.